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ADVISING THE COSMOPOLIS
ERIC BROWN 
Department of Philosophy, Box 1073 
Washington University 
S t  Louis, MO 63130 
eabrown @ twi nearth. wustl. edu
A B ST R A C T
Plutarch charges that Stoic theory is inconsistent with Stoic political 
engagement no matter what they decide to do, because the Stoics' endorsement o f  
the political life is inconsistent with their cosmopolitan rejection of ordinary 
politics (Stoic.rep., ab init.). Drawing on evidence from Chrysippus and 
Seneca, I develop an argument that answers this charge, and I draw out two 
interesting implications of the argument. The first implication is for scholars o f  
ancient Stoicism who like to say that Stoicism is apolitical. The argument I 
reconstruct turns on the political importance of the practice o f giving and taking 
advice, and in this way makes clear a philosophically significant way in which 
Stoic ethics is itself political. The second implication is for moral and political 
theorists who are quick to contrast cosmopolitanism with patriotic political 
engagement. My Chrysippean and Senecan argument shows how Stoics could 
envision local political engagement as an instantiation of cosmopolitan 
commitments.
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Introduction
If  you believe that philosophy is the art of living, then you should be bothered to leam that 
your philosophical doctrines are at odds with your life. That is why the ancient Stoics are put in a 
particularly awkward situation by the two criticisms with which Plutarch begins his study On Stoic 
Self-Contradictions. Plutarch first points out that the principal Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes, and 
Chrysippus failed to live in agreement with their recommendation that a person should engage in 
politics. Then he charges that those Stoics who did engage in politics contradicted Stoic doctrine 
even more severely, since Stoic doctrine holds that the cosmos is, as it were, a polis, while 
ordinary poleis (or "polises") do not deserve the name.
Many of the alleged self-contradictions that Plutarch dredges up are based on 
misunderstandings or polemical distortions. But these initial criticisms have remarkable staying 
power. The claims that the Stoics were damned if they did engage in politics ánd damned if they 
did not together imply that there is an underlying inconsistency between their endorsement of 
political engagement and their commitment to the cosmopolis in place of the local polis, and 
allegations of this underlying inconsistency have not disappeared. In fact, we are told again and 
again by eminent scholars that Stoicism is fundamentally apolitical.1 Moreover, we are told again 
and again by eminent moral philosophers and political theorists that attention to the community of 
all human beings at the expense of recognizing special political ties to the locals is not possible for 
us.2 Both of these contemporary claims raise questions for our understanding of the Stoics. I f  
Stoicism is fundamentally apolitical, then why do the Stoics recommend the political life? And if 
cosmopolitan disregard for local attachments is fundamentally impossible, then how do the Stoics 
recommend the political life?
1 See, e.g.. Annas. The Morality of Happiness. 302-311. (Here and throughout the notes are imperfect. I apologize 
for this and hope that imperfect notes will be received better than an absence o f notes.)
2 Isaiah Berlin, e.g., said in an interview that human beings must "have kith and kin and feel closer to some people 
than to others."
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I believe that we can answer these questions, that the Stoics have a consistent view relating 
political engagement to the cosmopolis, and that they have ready answers to Plutarch's ancient 
charges. Moreover, I believe that a proper understanding of how the Stoics relate political 
engagement to the cosmopolis calls into question both of the claims persistently made nowadays.
In what follows, I develop and justify the interpretation of Stoicism that sustains these 
beliefs. Instead of talking nebulously of "Stoic ethics" and conflating what are in fact several 
different Stoicisms, however, I concentrate on two Stoics for whom we have a reasonable supply 
of evidence: the leading Greek of the third century BCE, Chrysippus, and à prolific Roman of the 
first century ce , Seneca. I construct a response to Plutarch's criticisms that consists of four main 
claims, and for each I shall attempt to show how and why the claim is endorsed by both 
Chrysippus and Seneca. Then I conclude by making explicit how the four-stage response to 
Plutarch has relevance to, the contemporary concerns. On the one hand, I suggest that our scholars 
who have skipped over the allegedly apolitical Stoics' interests in the political life have missed one 
o f the most interesting features of Stoicism, its emphasis on advice as a topic of moral philosophy. 
On the other hand, I suggest that our moral and political thinkers who have insisted on the 
incompatibility of cosmopolitan commitments and "real" politics have missed one of the most 
philosophically interesting challenges emanating from the Stoic tradition.
1 .
The first step in the Stoic position I mean to explicate concerns the point of engaging in 
politics. Both Chrysippus and Seneca hold that the goal of politics is to help people become better. 
Diogenes Laertius reports Chrysippus' view of this quite clearly: [A] "[The Stoics] say that the 
sage will participate in politics, if nothing prevents him—so says Chrysippus in the first book of 
On Lives—for they say that he will restrain vice and promote virtue."3 Seneca records this view
3 D L V II121: πολιτεύσεσθαί φασι τον σοφόν δν μή τι κώλυε), ώς φησι Χρύσιππος έν πρώ τω  Περί Βίων καί 
γ ά ρ  κακίαν έφέξειν καί έπ αρετήν παρορμήσειν.
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more indirectly. In D eTranquillitate Animi, he has Serenus express the desire to engage in politics 
in order to be "serviceable and useful" to others,4 and in De Beneficiis, as we shall see, he 
emphasizes that improving others is the best way of being serviceable and useful.
Neither Chrysippus nor Seneca is saying merely that bettering others is the abstract goal of 
politics in general. Rather, it is the goal aimed at by a human being engaged in politics. In other 
words, our Stoics explain the agent's engagement in politics by appealing to the agent's desire to 
better others. This point is worth emphasizing, as it depends upon embedding the work of politics 
into the motivational structure of the human agent. (It depends, in other words, on conceiving of 
the human being as a political animal.) If we are looking for the Stoic account of why a person 
should.engage in politics, we should look at the Stoic account of desiring to help others. We 
should look, that is, at the virtue of beneficence.
The connection between beneficence and the point of politics can be drawn in two parts. 
First, Chrysippus and Seneca explain the desire to be beneficent by appealing to the following 
simple argument The good human life that is our aim is a virtuous life; possession o f any virtue 
requires possession of all the virtues; and beneficence is a virtue; therefore, the good human life 
that is our aim requires beneficence. Therefore, we have reason to be beneficent.
There is no doubting that both Chrysippus and Seneca are committed to this little piece of 
reasoning concerning beneficence. The first premise—that the good life is a virtuous life—is 
absolutely ubiquitous in the surviving writings, though it is perhaps worth mentioning how 
controversial the claim is. The Stoic view is not merely that virtue is necessary for happiness or 
even that it is sufficient for happiness. Rather, the Stoics hold that since happiness is the goal of 
life (τό τέλος) and the goal of life is living in accordance with virtue, living virtuously just is 
happiness.5
4 Seneca, Trana 1.10: Placet imperia praeceptorum sequi et in mediant ire rem publicam; placet honores fasdsque 
non scilicet purpura aut virgis abductum capessere, sed ut amids propinquisque et omnibus dvibus, omnibus deinde 
mortalibus paratior utiliorque sim.
5 The evidence frequently concentrates on the (controversial enough) claim of virtue's suffidency for happiness, but 
there are occasional clarifications that make the more precise connection explidt. See, e.g., Plutarch, Stoic reo 
1046de, for the distinction between Epicurus' view of the productive suffidency o f virtue and Chrysippus' view o f
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Moreover, living virtuously requires possessing all the virtues since the virtues are a unity. 
Both Chrysippus and Seneca are quite clear about this second premise. Diogenes Laertius again 
fills us in about Chrysippus:
[The Stoics] say that the virtue entail each other and that anyone who has one has them all, 
since they have their theorems in common, as Chrysippus says in Book One of his On 
Virtues. Apollodorus says in his Old-School Physics, and Hecaton says in Book Three of 
his On Virtues.6
Seneca registers his agreement with this Stoic commonplace frequently. Consider, for example, 
his remark that "right reason is unified and simple."7
From the first two commitments, it follows that a good human life requires the possession 
of each and every virtue. So now it can be simply noted that beneficence is a virtue. Seneca is 
especially keen on beneficence, giving to it a sprawlingly long study (De Beneficiis) and the 
following praise [B]: "For what virtue do we venerate more? For which do we give more 
encouragement? Whom does this exhortation fit better them us who ratify the fellowship of the 
human race?"8 We have nothing from Chrysippus comparable to Seneca's De Beneficiis. But 
Seneca apparently did. Seneca finds the time to belittle Chrysippus' discussion of the Graces, the 
allegorical figures o f the favors one might do for another, and Seneca at least twice in De Beneficiis 
draws upon analogies he attributes to Chrysippus.9 Moreover, Plutarch is clearly aware of
virtue as happiness. Cf. the argument recorded by Alexander, de anima mant 166,21 Bruns, and the concise 
formulation o f DL VH 89: "Happiness exists in virtue" (έν αυτή τε εΐναι την ευδαιμονίαν). For Seneca, see 
c ita t io n s .
6 DL V il 125: Τάς δ’ άρετάς λε'γουσιν άντακλουθεΐν άλλήλαις καί τόν  μίαν εχοντα πάσας εχε ιν  είναι γά ρ  
αυτών τα θεωρήματα κοινά, καθάπερ Χρύσιππος έν τώ  πρώτω Περί άρετών φησιν. ’Απολλόδωρος δέ έν 
τή  Φυσική κατά τήν άρχαίαν. Έκάτων δέ έν τώ  τρίτω Περί άρετών. For Chrysippus’position in the dispute 
about how exactly to conceive o f the unity and plurality of the virtues, see especially Plutarch, Stoic rep 1034cd and 
1046ef, with Schofield, "Aristón o f Chios and the Unity of Virtue."
7 Ep 66.11 : Una enim est ratio recta simplexque. See also Eg 85 and 92. more consideration here
8 Seneca, Ben I 15.2: Quant enim virtutem magis Γνϊζ.. benignitate] veneramur? Cui magis stimulos addimus? 
Quibusve tarn convertit haec adhortado quam nobis sodetatem generis humani sandentibus? check Latin
9 On the Graces, see Seneca, Ben I 8-9. Cf. Philodemus, De pietate (SVF 2.1081) for evidence that Chrysippus 
wrote a book On Graces. The other certain references are Ben II 17.3 and 25.3.
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Chrysippean writings on how to be beneficent toward ordinary people (Stoic rep 1038a). So there 
is no reason to doubt that Chrysippus subscribed to the reported Stoic doctrine that beneficence is a 
virtue.10
Having motivated to some extent the desire to be beneficent, Chrysippus and Seneca need 
to give the second half of the story by saying why beneficence requires making other people 
better.11 Here is where things get complicated. On the one hand, the Stoic account of the good 
would seem to make bettering others the paradigm case of benefiting others. On the other hand, 
the Stoic account of the good would seem to make bettering others impossible.
To explain this puzzle and a possible response to it, I will slip into the mode of talking 
about "the Stoics" in order to draw on the general doxographies which surely represent views that 
both Chrysippus and Seneca accept
The crux of the matter is that the Stoic account of goodness. The Stoics believe that what is 
good and what benefits are the same thing, and they believe that only virtue is good. The first of 
these doctrines is definitional. Our sources tell us that "the Stoics say that good is either the same 
as or not other than benefit."12 Given this definition of 'good', the Stoics insist that the only things 
that can be good are those that always benefit. Those things like strength and wealth that can be 
used well or badly and that thus can either benefit or harm are not in themselves good.13 Such a
10 The reported doctrine is that beneficence (χρηστότης) is, in particular, a specific kind o f "justice," the only social 
virtue among the four primary virtues. For some kinds o f "justice," see Stobaeus I I 7 60,10-11 and 60,22-24  
Wachsmuth and compare the textually problematic DL V II92-93.
111 cannot here discuss the large question o f why Chrysippus and Seneca believe that beneficence is a virtue, but I 
have discussed it elsewhere. See (citations deleted for anonym ity).
12 DL VII 94, Sextus Μ X I 22. As Sextus explains, good is benefit in the strictest sense, and not other than benefit 
in the looser senses. There are three senses (Stobaeus Π 7  69,17-70,3 Wachsmuth; Sextus M X I 25-26; and the 
textually problematic DL V II94): in the primary sense, good is that from which or by which (άφ' ου η ύφ' οδ) 
benefiting results; the second sense is that in accordance with which (καθ' δ) benefiting results; and third is that 
"such as" (oîov) to benefit.
13 Cf. Plutarch Stoic rep 1048c, Sextus M 11.61, Seneca Ep 120.3.
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thing might count as "convenient" (εΰχρήστημα; commodum). But only virtue is always a source 
of benefit, and thus only virtue is good.14
This restrictive account of goodness begins to suggest how benefiting another would have 
to improve that other's character. In fact, we might now be tempted to say that since nothing other 
than virtue is beneficial, any attempt to benefit someone should focus on character and not on 
anything else. But a problem lurks. Because benefit is restricted to goods and goods are restricted 
to the virtuous, it follows that only the virtuous can benefit and be benefited. The Stoics are 
explicit about this: "They say that the worthless share in no good, since goodness is virtue or what 
shares in virtue, and the things associated with goods—whatever things are needed, since they are 
benefits—occur only for the excellent."15 Moreover, the Stoics believe that there are no degrees of 
virtue or vice. Either one is in harmony with the nature of the cosmos or one is not, and there are 
no degrees of being out of tune.16 Now we have our problem. If benefits can only be bestowed 
upon the virtuous and if the virtuous cannot be made better, then it cannot be true that benefiting 
others is a matter of making them better.
To escape this problem, we need to relax the strict conditions linking goodness, benefit, 
and virtue. First, we should recall the Stoic doctrine that virtuous actions are describable as 
identical to actions that we worthless folks can do. While I cannot beneficently give a needy 
person ten dollars, I can appropriately give a needy person ten dollars, and if I were virtuous, that
14 That is , only virtue is good in the first, strictest sense. Virtuous actions are good in the second and (thereby the) 
third senses; virtuous persons and collections of persons (e.g., a city properly so denominated) are good in the third 
sense. But because only virtue is good in  all three senses, there is a point to the insistence that only virtue is  good. 
For the connection among 'good', benefit', and 'virtue', consider also the definition of 'to benefit': "[The Stoics say] 
that to benefit is to move or sustain in  accordance with virtue [ώφελεΐν δε έστι κινεΐν η ΐσχειν κατ' αρετήν]" (DL 
V II104).
15 Stobaeus Π 7 101,5-9 Wachsmuth: Των τε αγαθών μηδενός μετέχειν τούς φαύλους, επειδή τό  αγαθόν  
αρετή έστιν ή τό μετέχον άρετής· τά  τε παρακείμενα τοΐς άγαθοίς, απερ έστίν ών χρή, ώφελήματα όντα, 
μόνοις τοΐς σπουδαίοις συμβαίνειν.
16 For this doctrine, see DL VH 127; Stobaeus Π 7  113,18ff. Wachsmuth; Plutarch, Comm not 1063ab, and compare 
the related claim that the sage is just as happy as Zeus. The fact that Stoics conceive o f full knowledge (knowledge 
as a system o f kataleptic grasps and not merely as a kataleptic grasp) along coherentist lines helps to make these 
proclamations more intelligible: it is not crazy to insist that any set o f beliefs that includes an inconsistency is 
incoherent
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same action would be beneficent. So my motivation to act as beneficence requires does not 
disappear just because I am not, at this moment, actually in a position to do something that strictly 
speaking counts as beneficent. To convey the relevance of beneficence to me, we might even set 
aside the strictures and be willing to talk as though I could do beneficent actions.
That Chrysippus and Seneca are aware of this problem and of this solution is, I think, 
perfectly clear. Seneca is explicit about relaxed standard for benefits in De Beneficiis. for example. 
He reminds us his discussion of beneficence is not limited to sages, but is intended to apply to 
more ordinary people who are making progress toward virtue.17 And Plutarch records that 
Chrysippus, too, was willing to talk as if non-goods were actually good, so long as we kept in 
mind that we were employing relaxed standards: Plutarch tells us that "Chrysippus writes in his 
work On Rhetoric that the sage will speak publicly and engage in politics as if wealth, reputation, 
and health were goods."18
Yet as we allow our Stoics to talk about ordinary folks doing things that are in some sense 
beneficent, we should not lose sight of the reasons underlying the strict standard. The Stoics are 
right to insist that if I give you some money I may or may not be benefiting you. It depends upon 
whether it was appropriate for me to give you the money and on whether you are going to use the 
money well. If you use the money poorly, then my action was no benefit for you. Or if I give you 
the money at entirely the wrong time—if I interrupt a sacred moment with my hand outstretched, 
clutching the ten dollars I want you to have—then my action is no benefit for you. That is why the 
Stoics insist that if an action is to benefit another, both the giver and the receiver must be virtuous. 
If the more relaxed approach to beneficence is going to respect this, the relaxed benefits still need 
to be tied to a strong character. Moreover, even in the relaxed discussion, the kind of quasi-benefit 
that helps another person's imperfect character improve should be recognized as far, far more
17 See esp. Ben II 18.4, and cf., e.g.. Eg 42.1: Do you know whom I now mean by 'good man'? I mean one like 
this, o f the second rank. For the other sort is bom, like the phoenix, perhaps only once in five hundred years.
18 Plutarch. Stoic rep 1034b: Χρύσιππος δέ πάλιν έν τώ περί ’Ρητορικής γράφων ούτω ς ρητορευσειν και 
πολιτεύσεσθαι τον σοφόν ώ ς και τού πλούτου ό'ντος άγαθου και τής δόξης και τής ύγιείας ομολογεί τούς  
λόγους αυτών ανέξοδους εϊναι και άπολιτεύτους και τά δόγματα ταΐς χρείαις ανάρμοστα και ταΐς 
πράξεσιν.
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valuable than some other kind of quasi-benefit. That is, the Stoics should agree that it is better to 
teach a person how to fish than it is to give the person fish, though of course the Stoics seek a 
more demanding, general kind of knowledge than that of fishing.
Again, it is tolerably clear that our Stoics do make this move, that they do elevate the 
relaxed beneficence of moral education above the relaxed beneficence of material resources. Only 
such a thought would explain Seneca's declaration that [C] "in benefits, I am necessarily defeated 
by Socrates, necessarily defeated by Diogenes, who marched naked through the middle of the 
Macedonians' treasures, treading upon the wealth of a king.”19 The thought is also registered well 
in Cicero's account of Stoic ethics in De Finibus III [D]: "Moreover, we are impelled by nature to 
want to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by teaching with reasons and principles 
of wisdom."20 Finally, I suggest, this thought explains why Chrysippus recommends the political 
life [in (A)]. We should engage in politics not because it affords us the opportunity to spread 
material resources around, but because it allows us to "promote virtue and restrain vice.21
19 Seneca, Βοι V 43: Necesse est a Socrate beneficiis vicar, necesse est a Diogene, qui per medias Macedonian gazas 
nudus incessit calcatis régis opibus. This may surprise anyone who holds as Cooper and Procopé (186) do that De 
Beneficiis is ,fa work about acts of kindness by individuals to other individuals.” This judgment is correct about the 
core relationship of beneficence traditionally understood and perhaps correct about Seneca’s primary interests. But De 
Beneficiis moves toward a general theory o f beneficence that allows for beneficia to be given very broadly and 
without expectation of return. The importance of advice might not be obvious on a first reading of Seneca’s long, 
rambling treatise De Beneficiis (though it is interesting that Wright, "Form and Content in the Moral Essays.” esp. 
40, links Seneca’s rambling structures with his desire to provide especially persuasive nuggets o f advice). But it is  
definitely there, right from the start, when Seneca advises (!) Aebutius to ’’help [adiuva] one person with money frei, 
another with credit ffidel. another with influence [gratia!, another with advice fconsiliol. another with healthy 
praecepta" (Beni  2.4). Furthermore, Seneca’s elaborate classification of benefits (Ben 1 11.1-5) also holds a place for 
advice. Seneca classifies libertas, pudicitia, and mens bona as necessaries ’’without which we ought not live" (Ben I 
11.2,4), in contrast to what is necessary for living, what is necessary because we are not willing to live without it 
(such as our family and our household gods), what is merely useful (in the way that money and public office [honor! 
is), and what is pleasurable; presumably, advice is the vehicle for providing the beneficia of libertas, pudicitia. and 
mens bona. Throughout the rest o f  De Beneficiis. Seneca occasionally reminds us that advice is an important kind 
of benefit (e.g., Bm  III 9.2).
20 Cicero, Fin III 65: Impellimur autem natura ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo 
rationibusque prudentiae tradendis.
21 A s I explain in detail elsewhere ("Stoic Rules"), the Stoics use the formula ’the sage will <p’ to say that φ-ing is an 
appropriate type of action for all human beings, i.e., a type of action which is generally in accordance with nature, a 
καθήκον. If w e put this together with Diogenes’ report, we will not be surprised to learn from Stobaeus (II 7 8 6 3 )  
that the Stoics consider serving on embassies (πρεσβεύειν) to be an appropriate action.
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2 .
Thus far, I have tried to show that the Stoic goal of politics is to help people become better, 
and that this goal is the highest aim of beneficence, a required virtue. Our next step is to determine 
more precisely how we can help people become better. Seneca's reference to Diogenes marching 
naked over treasures gives some clue to one way of helping others: we can set a memorable 
example for them. Cicero's mention of "teaching by reasons and principles of wisdom" suggests a 
less colorful way of doing the trick. The Stoics evidently gave considerable attention to die 
question of how one can help others progress toward virtue, for they introduced a branch of 
philosophy which is explicitly concerned with this question, called praeceptiva or παραινετική.22 
Unfortunately, most of the work in this branch of philosophy is lost to us now, and we need to 
rely quite heavily on two of Seneca's longer letters to Lucilius (94 and 95). These letters reveal at 
least four wavs in which a person can help to make another better, which I would like to identify. 
Then I shall argue that both Seneca and Chrysippus make room for these four ways in their 
discussions of politics.23
In brief, then, the four ways are these. First, we can offer general principles (decreta. 
δόγμ α τα , Ep 95.10) of value and explain their inferential connections to other general principles 
of value and truths (Ep 95.61; cf. 94.27). These principles announce, for example, what sort of 
thing virtue is, or why externals are indifferent to our happiness. This method of helping others is 
only likely to be helpful to someone who has already made significant progress. Second, we can 
endorse particular kinds of actions in the form of particular rules or proverbial reminders, both of
22 Seneca, Eg 95.1. Cf. Sextus, Μ  V II12. If DL V II84 includes the parainetic branch in ethics by the phrase περί 
τω ν καθηκόντων προτροπώ ν τε και αποτροπώ ν, then we can safely attribute it to Chrysippus.
23 Sometimes Seneca suggests a different taxonomy o f advice, based on general styles and aims. In this vein, he 
suggests that monitio is a general category which includes consolado, dissuasio. adhortado, obiurgatio. and laudado 
(Bp 94.39; cf. Eg 94.25), and he notes that Posidonius classifies praecentio as a style of advising on a par with 
suasio. consolado, and exhortado (Eg 95.65). But I am more interested in the distinction in Epistulae 94-95 that 
cuts across these kinds of advice and differentiates pieces of advice by the inferential and evidentiary content.
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which get called precepts (praecepta).24 These precepts are more closely attached to action in 
particular kinds o f circumstances than to universal truths (Ep 9435), and they depend upon the 
general principles as conclusions of practical reasoning depend upon general premises concerning 
value (Ep 95.12; cf. Eg 94.31). Precepts are useful in providing more concrete advice and in 
painting a general picture of what sorts of things one should be doing. Besides offering principles 
and precepts, we can also set an example for others to follow. The Stoics are especially attentive to 
the importance of imitation in moral education.
The fourth way of helping another to progress toward virtue is crucial. To make moral 
progress, we need more than the first three kinds of advice. The problem is not just that anyone 
looking to make moral progress must get beyond reading and memorizing others' thoughts in order 
to reach the point where he is thinking through the reasons for himself.25 Progress requires 
increasing sensitivity to· the demands of the particular situation, and the three general kinds of 
advice cannot speak directly to any particular situation. Seneca reminds his correspondent Lucilius 
of how a "large part of advice" has to be tailored to a specific situation in order to be helpful:
[E] Constantly you consult me concerning particular matters, forgetting that we are 
separated by a vast sea. Since a large part of advice iconsiliuml depends on its 
timeliness, it necessarily happens that my opinion on certain matters will reach you 
at a time when the contrary opinion is better. For advice fits circumstances. Our 
circumstances are carried along, or even rushed. Thus, advice should be bom on 
the spo t...26
24 Seneca's examples o f praecepta are either rules o f the form One should (not) <p in such-and-such a way (in such- 
and-such circumstances, possessing such-and-such role rpersonaT)' or proverbs like 'Be thrifty with time'. In Eg 94, 
see sections 5, 8, 1 1 ,2 2 ,2 7 , 43.
25 See especially Eg 33, 80.1, 84, 108.
26 Seneca, Eg 71.1: Subinde me de rebus singulis consults oblitus vasto nos mari dividí. Cum magna pars consilii 
sit in tempore, necesse est evenire, ut de quibusdam rebus tunc ad te pederá tur sententia mea, cum iam contraria 
potior est. Consilia enim rebus aptantu. Res nostrae feruntur, immo volvuntur. Ergo consilium nasd sub diem  
debet... It might be thought that Seneca is simply saying that the advice must be able to reach Lucilius in time, and . 
that the distance between them is making all advice tardy. This cannot be right, however. First, it makes Lucilius 
out to be an idiot, who repeatedly fails to realize that the overseas post does not work instantaneously. Second, it
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This kind of advice, clearly enough, can only be given to those few persons whose characters and 
situations one knows well.
Having extracted from Seneca's discussion in Letters 94 and 95 four kinds of advice—four 
ways of helping others to become better agents—I now wish to show that both Seneca and 
Chrysippus are sensitive to these four kinds of advising as means of doing politics. I will start not 
with the general principles but with the more specific precepts. One crucial way in which the 
political life issues precepts is through legislation. Seneca's discussion of the usefulness of 
precepts includes a discussion on the usefulness of laws on the grounds that laws are just a kind of 
precept, mixed with threats.27 For Chrysippus, the evidence is less explicit, but not impossible to 
come by. Consider the following important passage concerning Stoic ethics in Stobaeus' 
Anthology:
[F] It follows on· these points that the sage engages in politics, especially in the sorts of 
polities which manifest some progress toward being perfect polities, and that he gives laws 
and educates people, and further, that it is appropriate for excellent people to write things 
which are capable of benefiting those who encounter their words...28
misses the more general emphasis on situational appropriateness which is echoed in other passages o f the Letters 
(e.g., Eg 22.1-2 and Eg 64.8). Seneca's discussion of praecepta emphasizes again and again the importance of 
having an guide (e.g., sections 4 0 ,5 0 , 52, 55 ,69-72  of Eg 94).
27 Ep 94.37. Seneca's argument comes as a response to an Aristonian objector, who insists that because laws are 
rules and laws are useless for moral education, rules are useless: "He [sc. the objector] says. Laws do not make us do 
what we ought to do, and what else are they besides rules mixed with threats?"' ("Leges,* inquit, "utfaciamus quod 
oportet non efficiunt, et quid aliud sunt quam minis mixta praecepta? ”). Seneca responds at first by distinguishing 
laws qua threatening commands, which are useless, and rules, which are useful: "First of all, laws do not persuade 
just because they threaten, and praecepta do not force, but encourage. Second, laws frighten one from crime, 
praecepta urge one to appropriate action" (Primum omnium ob hoc illae non persuadent quia minantur, at haec non 
cogunt, sed exorant; deinde leges a scelere deterrent, praecepta in officium adhortantur). But then Seneca adds a further 
point, that some laws are not merely commands, but are in fact useful, educative rules: "Add to these the fact that 
laws are also beneficial for good conduct, at least if  they not only command, but teach" (His adice quod leges quoque 
proficiunt ad bonos mores, utique si non tantum imper ant sed docent).
28 Stobaeus I I 7,94,7-20: επόμενον δε τουτοις ύπαρχειν καί το πολιτεύεσθαι τον σοφόν και μάλιστ' έν ταΐς  
τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταΤς έμφαινούσαις τινα προκοπήν προς τάς τελείας πολιτείας* και τό  νομοθετεΐν δε 
και τό παιδεύειν ανθρώπους, ετι δε συγγράφειν τα δυνάμενα ώφελεΐν τούς έντυγχάνοντας τοΐς  
γράμμασιν οίκεΐον είναι τοΐς σπουδαίοις και τό  συγκαταβαίνειν και εις γάμον καί εις τεκνογονίαν καί 
αύτου χάριν καί τή ς πατρίδος καί υπομένειν περί ταύτης. εάν ή μετρία. καί πόνους καί θάνατον. My 
translation leaves off the last clause as its relation to Chrysippean doctrine is less clear.
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A comparison o f this passage with two similar ones in Stobaeus' Anthology and with independent 
evidence citing Chrysippus' On Lives leaves the Chrysippean provenance of this report quite 
secure. We can take this as a record of what Chrysippus' On Lives said. But what are we told 
about Chrysippus' view? We have an explanation of how the political life and the philosophical 
life can benefit people: the former educates and gives laws, whereas the latter writes beneficial 
books. All that I want to suggest is that the political life's law-giving is introduced in part to 
explain more precisely how the political life educates.29 Chrysippus' On Lives would have said 
that the goal of politics—promoting virtue and restraining vice—is served by law-giving.
It is quite plausible to suppose that laws function as precepts, and thus that politics by laws 
can effect moral education as if by precepts. But we might have thought that general principles and 
inferential connections among them are the special province of the philosopher and the 
philosophical style of moral education. But we would have been wrong. Consider the following 
passage in Seneca's discussion of laws as precepts:
[G] On this matter I disagree with Posidonius [a Stoic of c. 135-c. 50 bce], who says, "I 
do not think that preambles should have been added by Plato's Laws. For a  law should be 
brief, so that it may more easily be grasped by the ignorant It should be like a divine voice 
sent down; it should command, not discuss. Nothing seems to me more cold, nothing 
more unfitting, than a law with a preamble. Warn me, tell me what you want me to do; I 
am not learning, but obeying." But they are beneficial, and thus you will see that states 
which have bad laws have bad conduct.30 ,
Posidonius firmly rejects the idea that laws should have preambles because he believes that laws 
should be mere commands. But Seneca is clear that preambles are valuable. An account of why 
the law is promulgated, of the principles related to the law, help to make the law beneficial.
29 The link is even tighter if  we follow Heeren and emend from καί τό νομοθετεϊν Μ  και το παιδεύειν 
ανθρώπους to και τό νομοθετεϊν τε και το παιδεύειν ανθρώπους.
30 Seneca, E n9438: In hac re dissentio a Posidonio, qui <"inprobo," inquitp> "quod Hatonis legibus adiecta 
principia sunt. Legem enim brevem esse oportet, quo facilius ab impends teneatur. Velut emissa divinitus vox sit; 
iubeat, on disputet. Nihil videtur mihi frigidius, nihil ineptius quam lex cum prologo. Mone, die quid me velis
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Hence, the political life concern for laws as educative tools should extend to a concern for general 
principles as educative tools.
Only speculation can link this account of the role of general principles to Chrysippus’ 
account of the political life. We might note that Stoics of Chrysippus' time were deeply interested 
in Plato’s Laws. (One of them, Persaeus, wrote a work in seven books In Reply to Plato's Laws 
(DL VII 36).) And we might suppose that Posidonius was breaking with earlier Stoics, including 
Persaeus and Chrysippus, on this issue as he broke with them on many other issues.
However that may be, general principles can find their way into the toolbox of the 
Chrysippean politician in a second way, which we can see if we skip ahead to consider the role of 
close, personal advice in the political life. There is no doubt that both Chrysippus and Seneca 
endorse the importance of this kind of education, for they envision as a principal kind of political 
engagement the life of the political advisor.31 Here consider a pair of reports for what Chrysippus 
recommends in his On Lives, the first from Plutarch and the second from Stobaeus:
fedsse: non disco sed pareo." Proficiunt vero; itaque malis moribus uti videbis civitates usas malis legibus.
31 There is in addition to this the role o f close, personal, erotically charged education in Chrysippus’ picture o f the 
ideal polis. The crucial evidence is DL V II129: ’They also say that the sage will love the young who manifest by 
their appearance a natural endowment for virtue, as Zeno says in his Republic, and Chrysippus says in  the first book 
o f On Lives and Apollodorus in his Ethics” (και έρασθησεσθαι 6έ τον σοφόν τώ ν νέων τω ν έμφαινόντων διά 
του είδους την προς αρετήν ευφυΐαν, ώς φησι Ζήνων έν τη Πολιτεία καί Χρύσιππος εν τω  πρώ τω  Περί 
Βίων και ‘Απολλόδωρος έν τή ‘ηθική). Malcolm Schofield (The Stoic Idea of the City [Cambridge. 1991], chp. 2) 
has explained how this love is aimed at turning the young toward developing their natural endowment for virtue.
The explanation rests primarily on Stoic definitions related to love. First, the Stoic definition of the science o f love: 
’I t  is the science of the chase after youths of good nature, being for turning them toward living in accordance with 
virtue, and in general it is the science of loving honorably. That is why they also say that the one who has 
intelligence will be a lover” (Stobaeus I I 7 66,6-9 Wachsmuth: την δ* επιστήμην νε'ων Θήρας εύφυών. προς  
τρέψιν ουσαν επί τ<ό ζ>ήν κατ' αρετήν, διό καί φασιν έρασθήσεσθαι τον νουν εχοντα). For further evidence 
o f love’s protreptic function in Stoicism, see Athenaeus SVF 1.247. For other evidence that the Stoics thought the 
sage would be a lover, see Stobaeus I I 7 115,2-4 Wachsmuth; Cicero Fin III 68, Cicero Tuse IV 72, Stobaeus SVF  
3.720. (Note that the sage’s love must be distinguished from the passion love, even though the sage’s love is 
defined in terms of the same apparent actions as the passion love (Stobaeus I I 7 91,5-6 Wachsmuth, and DL VII 
113). The distinction between the sage’s love and the passion love is not in outward behavior, but in inward 
attitude, for the sage proceeds from knowledge and without passion.) So the sage pursues the youth whose beauty is 
the potential to be virtuous, and the sage tries to turn the youth from potential to actual virtue. If the sage should 
succeed in turning his beloved toward virtue, then they will enjoy the true friendship that only two sages can enjoy. 
(See, e.g., Stobaeus II 7 108,5ff. Wachsmuth, DL VII 33, DL V II124, Cicero Nat D I 121, Clement SVF 1.223.) 
Accordingly, a standard Stoic definition of love' identifies friendship as the goal o f love: "They say that love is an 
attempt to make friends on account of a manifestation of beauty, and it is thus not for sexual intercourse, but for 
friendship" (DL VII 129: είναι δε τον έρωτα επιβολήν φιλοποιίας δια κάλλος έμφαινόμενον και μή είναι
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[H] That he [sç. the sage] does these things for the sake of trade and money, he [sç. 
Chrysippus] has also made clear earlier fsc. in Book One of On Lives (cf. Stoic rep 
1043bcd)] by positing three ways of making money which agree especially well with the 
sage: from kingship, from friends, and third, after these, from lecturing.32
[I] [They say] that there are three principal lives, the kingly, the political, and third, the life 
concerned with knowledge. Similarly, there are also three principal ways of making 
money: from kingship, by which [the sage] will either be king or will thrive on kingly 
funds; second, from government, for he will engage in politics in accordance with guiding 
reason, for he will also marry and produce children, for these things accord with the nature 
of a rational animal, fit for community and loving others. Thus, he will make money both 
from government and from friends who are in authority. And concerning giving lectures 
and making money from giving lectures.. .  they are agreed on making money from people 
for education and on occasionally taking fees from those who love learning.33
συνουσίας» αλλά φιλίας. There are also other reports defining love as an attempt to produce friendship: Stobaeus 
I I 7 66,12-13 and 115,1-2 Wachsmuth, Cicero Tuse IV 72, SVF 3.721-722. Plutarch (Comm not 1073a and at 
Compendium 1058a, explicitly sticks the Stoics with saying that love stops once one’s beloved has become 
beautiful. This fits well with the rest o f the evidence: once one’s beloved becomes virtuous and therefore truly 
beautiful, then friendship replaces love.). And so the sage’s love for a good-natured youth stimulates moral 
education, for the sake o f forming a friendship. The whole account should be compared with Plato’s Symposium. 
where love similaily stimulates the lover to turn his beloved toward virtue (209a8-dl).
32 Plutarch. Stoic rep 1043e: δτι γά ρ  εργασίας ενεκα και χρηματισμου ταυτα ποιεί και προδεδήλωκε τρεΤς 
ύποθέμενος αρμόζοντας μάλιστα τώ  σοφω χρηματισμούς, τον από βασιλείας και τον α π ό  φίλων και 
τρίτον έπι τούτοις τον από σοφιστείας.
33 Stobaeus II 7  109,10-24 Wachsmuth: Τρεις δε προηγούμενους είναι βίους, τόν τε βασιλικόν κ&ι τον  
πολιτικόν και τρίτον τόν επιστημονικόν* ομοίως δε και χρηματισμούς τρεΐς προηγούμενους, τόν τε  από  
της βασιλείας, καθ' δν η αυτός βασιλεύσει η μοναρχικών χρημάτων ευπορήσει* δεύτερον δέ τόν άπό τής  
πολιτείας, πολιτεύσεσθαι γάρ κατά τόν προηγούμενον λ ό γ ο ν  και γά ρ  γαμήσειν και παιδοποιήσεσθαι, 
άκολουθεΐν <γάρ> ταυτα τή του λογικού ζώου και κοινωνικού και φιλαλλήλου <φύσει>. Χρηματιείσθαι οδν 
και άπό τής πολιτείας και από των φίλων, των εν ύπεροχαϊς ό'ντων. Περί δέ του σοφιστεύσειν και άπό  
σοφιστείας εύπορήσειν χρημάτων. . . Τό μεν γάρ χρηματιείσθαι άπό τω ν κατά την παιδείαν και μισθούς 
ποτέ λήψεσθαι παρά των φιλομαθούντων διωμολογήσαντο. The subject of the various infinitives is 
unidentified, but it is surely meant to be the sage, as the sage—variously indentified as ό σοφός, ό  σπουδαίος, and 
ό τόν νουν έχώ ν—has been discussed throughout the immediate context, and indeed throughout virtually all of 
93,19-116,10. The omitted text refers to a disagreement about whether a lecturer should ’’play the Sophist” 
(σοφιστεύειν) in making money from lecturing. I take it that the comparison with Plutarch’s report (in |H ]) is 
enough to show that Stobaeus’ testimony reflects the Chrysippean doctrine on lives, though Stobaeus or some 
source has spliced into the report on three ways of making money a quite separate point that is not concerned with 
making money, namely, the familiar doxographical obsession with families as political products. On that
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The second kind of life can sound faintly ridiculous: the sage is supposed to sponge off of his 
friends? Critics were quick to lampoon the propositi.34 But in fact the critics are either missing the 
point or acting in bad faith, for these "friends" are not the sage's, but the king's. The word 
'friends [φίλοι]' was commonly used in Chrysippus' time of the advisors in Hellenistic courts.3S 
So Chrysippus is recognizing the possibility of being a political advisor twice oven one might 
advise the king himself, or one might advise the advisors to the king. That Seneca, too, recognizes 
the possibility of advising as a political life needs less attention. Seneca's own life as a tutor to 
Nero and his production of advisory texts like De dem entia confirm Seneca's commitment to the 
possibility of engaging in politics as a close personal advisor.
Once personal advising of those in political power is seen as a way of helping to promote 
virtue and restrain vice, it should not be hard to suppose that such advising deals both in concrete, 
situational counsel about what should be done here and now and in general principles that can 
illuminate deliberations about what should be done. Because the actual advisor would use multiple 
kinds of advice, it is reasonable to suppose that both Chrysippus and Seneca recognize the 
importance of multiple kinds of advice in politics.36
Through being an advisor, one can influence law and its enforcement, which we have 
already seen to be a tool of moral education. But one can also influence a prominent person's
obsession, see Schofield. The Stoic Idea of the City. 119-127.
34 In addition to Plutarch (in [H]), see the anonymous criticisms reported in DL V II189: "Further, the ways of 
making a living are ridiculous, for example, from a king, for one will need to yield to him. And the one from 
friendship, for friendship will be for sale at a gain. And the one from wisdom, for wisdom will be mercenary. And 
these are the charges." (καίτοi τίνος χάριν ποριστέον αΰτώ: εί μεν γάρ του ζην ένεκεν, αδιάφορου τό  ζη ν  εΐ 
8έ ηδονής, και αυτή αδιάφορος' εί δέ τής αρετής, αυτάρκης αυτή πρός ευδαιμονίαν, καταγέλαστοι δε καί 
οΐ τρόποι τού πορισμού, οΤον οϊ από βασιλέως· εϊκειν γάρ αΰτώ δεήσει. καί οί από φιλίας- λήμματος γάρ  
ώνοις ή φιλία εσται. καί οί άπό σοφίας· μισθαρνήσει γάρ ή σοφία, καί ταϋτα μέν έγκαλεΐται.) Note that 
Hicks, in the Loeb edition, gets DL VII 188-189 quite wrong by attributing everything but the last sentence to 
Chrysippus himself, instead of to a skeptical critic. See Schofield, The Stoic Idea of the City, chp. 1.
35 See Musti and Walbank in CAH 2,7.1: 179 and 69-70. See also Konstan, Friendship in the Classical World. 93- 
108.
36 Some helpful discussion o f the historical role of philosophers as advisors to politicians in Rome is provided by 
Griffin, "Philosophy, Politics, and Politicians at Rome," and Rawson, "Roman Rulers and the Philosophic 
Adviser."
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behavior, and thus shape an example that others will imitate. For the Stoics recommend the 
political life in part because of its power to improve people by giving them a model. The 
importance of such models is pervasively noted in the work of Roman Stoics like Seneca, but it 
would be wrong to suggest that this Roman obsession is foreign to the earliest Stoics.37 In the 
third century b ce, philosophers and political rulers were sometimes cultishly admired as models, 
and the emphatic favor that Chrysippus shows for advising political rulers cannot be fully 
understood without this background.38
To sum up the second step of the Stoic response to Plutarch: there are four ways of helping 
others to make progress that find expression in Chrysippus' and Seneca's discussions of what 
politics does. This further supports the claim that politics is supposed to help others.
3 .
It also leads to the third step of the response. For these various politically engaged wavs of 
helping become better cannot help all people at once. I do not know of any evidence that any Stoic 
made this claim in quite so many words. But I believe that there are good reasons to attribute the 
claim to our Stoics and good reasons for our Stoics to make the claim. The crucial points are two.
The first point is that politically engaged help for other people would reach all people in just 
about the same way if there were a world-state, and the Stoics do not endorse the idea of a world- 
state.
It has been thought that Stoic cosmopolitanism is a political cosmopolitanism, a desire for a
X ...
world-state, but this thought is usually predicated on a misinterpretation of a misleading passage in
37 As does Sedley, "The Stoic-Platonist Debate," especially 150. But Sedley*s point is about the role o f exempta in  
the ethical theorizing, whereas I am here emphasizing the importance o f  models in ethical practice. Even if  some 
Stoics sought a set o f coherent principles without appeal to messy examples, still they might have recognized that 
anyone (even a sage) could benefit from advice and dialogue in working through more particular commitments in  the 
world.
38 On "ruler cults” in the Hellenistic world, see, e.g.. Green, From Alexander to Actium. The cult o f philosophers is , 
clearest in Epicurus* Garden, but not entirely unparalleled, given the widespread prominence of stories about 
Socrates, Diogenes, Pyrrho, etc.
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Plutarch's work On the Fortune or Virtue of Alexander. Plutarch is discussing the Republic of 
Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism:
[J] And the much admired Republic of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, strains to 
this one main point, in order that we should not live as cities and tribes each defining what 
is just individually, but that we should think that all human beings are fellow tribesmen and 
fellow citizens and that there should be one way of life and one cosmos or order, just as a 
herd grazes together, nurtured by a common law or pasturing. Zeno wrote this just as if he 
were imprinting again a dream or image of a philosopher's good order and republic, but it 
was Alexander who brought the theory to effect39 
Plutarch is engaged in a debate that was not uncommon in his day, a debate about whether 
Alexander the Great's success was due to his greatness or to luck. Plutarch believes that 
Alexander really was great, and that among other things, Alexander made real the merely 
theoretical promise of cosmopolitanism. But if Alexander made it real, then the theoretical promise 
was for something like a world-state. So Plutarch would seem to be saying that Zeno's Republic 
favors a world-state.
But in fact, Plutarch is misrepresenting Zeno's Republic. Other evidence makes it clear that 
Zeno's idea for an ideal city is for one city among others, and not for one super-sized city. 
According to Diogenes Laertius' crucial report [K], for example, "Zeno laid it dow n... that neither 
temples nor law-courts nor gymnasia should be built in cities [plural!]" and "concerning coinage he 
writes this: 'It must not be thought that coinage should be introduced either for purposes of 
exchange or for travelling abroad.'"40 These reports are nonsense if Zeno advocated a world-state.
39 Plutarch S VF 1.262: καί μήν ή πολύ θαυμαζομένη πολιτεία τού την Στωικών α'ίρεσιν καταβαλο μενού 
Ζήνωνος εις 'έν τούτο συντείνει κεφάλαιον. ϊνα μή κατά πόλεις μηδέ κατά δήμους οΐκώμεν. ΐδίοις έκαστοι 
διωρισμένοι δικαίοις, άλλα πάντα ς ανθρώπους ήγώμέθα δήμότας καί πολίτας, εΐς δέ βίος ή και κόσμος, 
ώ σπερ άγέλης συννόμου νόμω κοινφ συντρεφομένης. τούτο Ζήνων μεν εγραψεν ώσπερ οναρ ή εϊδωλον 
ευνομίας φιλοσόφου καί πολιτείας άνατυπω σάμενος...
40 D L V II33: [viz.,Ζήνωνα] δογματίζειν. . . μήτε ιερά μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε γυμνάσια έν ταΐς πόλεσιν 
οίκοδομείσθαι. Περί τε νομίσματα ούτω ς γρ άφ ειν "Νόμισμα δέ ούτε άλλαγής ενεκεν οΐεσθαι δείν 
κατασκευάζειν ούτε άποδημίας ενεκεν."
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W e can only speculate about why the Stoics do not endorse the idea of the world state. 
Perhaps they thought that the work of politics—helping to make people better—fails to work as 
well over large distances. But whatever the reasons, there is a second point to make in the service 
of the claim that the political work of helping others is of limited efficacy.
Only some people can optimally help others by engaging in politics. This is so for two 
reasons. First, some of us do not have the opportunity to be king or advisor to a king, or to have 
political power in some other way. Those of us to whom the political life is not available will have 
to find other ways of being beneficent, of helping others. Second, some of us might be able to 
help people better by avoiding political office and by engaging in the kinds of moral education 
outside of the institutions of politics. Seneca considers the Stoics Zeno, Cleanthes, and 
Chrysippus to have been in this second camp:
[L] We, at least, say that both Zeno and Chrysippus did greater things than if  they 
had led armies, held offices, made laws. The laws they made were not for one state 
but for the entire human race. Why, therefore, should it not befit the good man to 
have such leisure, by means of which he may govern future ages and publicly 
address not just a few people but all people of all nations who are and will be?41 
Hence, while it may seem that Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus lived contrary to their teaching, 
they in fact "found a way for their retirement fquiesl to benefit people more than the running and 
sweating o f others" (Otio 6.5). Teaching and writing, Seneca says, can serve as the deeds of 
otium that benefit far more people than traditional political action can.42
41 Otio 6.4: Nos certe sumus qui didmus et Zenonem et Chrysippum maiora egisse quam si duxissent exerdtus, 
gessissent honores, leges tulissent; quas non uni dvitati, sed toti humano generi tulerunt. Quid est ergo quare tale 
otium non conveniat viro bono, per quod futura saecula ordinet nec apud paucos contionetur sed apud omnis omnium 
gentium homines, quique sunt quieque erunt?
42 See also Trana 3 3 ,  Eg 14.14,38.1, 64.9, 89.13. Interestingly, in D e Otio. Seneca praises otinm for its potential 
to deliver all three kinds o f advice that are not personal and situationally specific: (1) decreta in the second argument 
(Otio 4.2); (2) laws=prraecepta in the third argument (Otio 6.4, with Eg 94.37); (3) models, covertly, in the first 
argument (Otio 3.5; cf. Otio 1.1).
Advising the Cosmopolis — 2 0
At this point, as a consequence of the second general sort of limitation on the efficacy of 
political beneficence, we have an answer to one of Plutarch's criticisms. It turns out that some 
people can meet the goal of politics better by staying out of politics, and so it is consistent to 
endorse the political life in general while excusing some people from engagement.
4 .
To answer Plutarch's other criticism, we have to return to the first of the general limitations 
on the efficacy of political engagement Because it is impossible for anyone to help all people in 
just the same way through politics, we must make a choice about which people to benefit. Helping 
some subset of people is the best we can do. Hence, it is possible to hold that helping some subset 
of people optimally instantiates rather than frustrates the desire to help people in general.
Given this limitation on political efficacy, the difference between the cosmopolitan's 
attention to the question o f whom we should benefit and the anti-cosmopolitan's attention to this 
question will turn on the consideration given to the possibility of helping foreigners instead of 
compatriots. Neither the cosmopolitan nor the anti-cosmopolitan seeks to help all citizens of the 
cosmos. That is impossible. But the cosmopolitan considers how she can best help her fellow 
cosmopolites by actively considering the possibility of more optimally benefiting people abroad, 
whereas the anti-cosmopolitan does not. The anti-cosmopolitan remains tied to benefiting these 
people rather than those; the cosmopolitan at least considers moving elsewhere."0
Both Chrysippus and Seneca are quite explicit in taking the cosmopolitan line that anyone 
considering the political life should consider the political life abroad. First, consider more o f the 43
43 This broad contrast papers over other possibilities. For example: one might consider benefiting abroad without 
thinking that one owes anything to one’s compatriots, or one might consider benefiting abroad while believing that 
one owes something to one's compatriots. Elsewhere I have called it the distinction between strict cosmopolitanism  
and moderate cosmopolitanism, and I have argued that Chrysippus maintains the former while Seneca plumps for the 
latter. But the difference depends on who has what claim to be one's beneficiaries, and thus turns on a longer inquiry 
into the virtue o f beneficence (see note 11 above). Here I am content to exploit the area o f  agreement between 
Chrysippus and Seneca, (citations deleted for anonymity)
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evidence for Chrysippus' On Lives, the work in which he endorses the life of politics. Again 
Plutarch is our source:
[M] But Chrysippus himself in the first book of On Lives says that the sage will 
voluntarily assume kingship and make money from it, and if he is not able to be king, he 
will live with a king and will serve a king, a king like Idanthyrsus the Scythian or Leucon 
the Pontian... "For," he says, "while holding to these things [viz., common conceptions? 
cf. Sextus, Μ X I 22] let us again examine the fact that he will serve and live with princes, 
since we have maintained this too for reasons much like the very considerations which have 
caused some not even to suspect it"  And after a little: "And not only with those who have 
made some progress by being engaged in disciplinary activities and certain habits, for 
example at the courts of Leucon and Idanthyrsos."44 
Chrysippus' examples are telling. Chrysippus, himself from Soli in Cilicia (southern Asia minor), 
was writing in Athens and recommending political engagement as far away as the Crimea or 
Scythia.45 These places might have seemed like the end of the earth, as they were surely at the 
outer reaches o f the Greek world (οικουμένη), and filled with non-Greek speakers.
Seneca makes a similar maneuver when he is advising Serenus to stay active in De 
Tranquillitate Animi:
44 Plutarch, Stoic reo 1043b-d: άλλ’ αυτός ό Χρύσιππος έν τώ πρώτω περί Βίων βασιλείαν τε  τόν σοφόν  
έκουσίως άναδεξεσθαι λέγει χρηματιζόμενον άπ' αυτής- καν αυτός βασιλεύειν μή δύνηται, συμβιώσεται 
βασιλεΤ και στρατεύσεται μετά βασιλέως. οΐος ήν Ίδάνθυρσος ά Σκύθης ή Λεύκων ό Ποντικός. . . . "ότι 
γάρ" φησι "καί στρατεύσεται μετά δυναστών καί βιώσεται, πάλιν έπισκεψώμεθα τούτω ν έχόμενοι. τινών 
μέν οΰδε ταΰτα ύπονοούντων διά τούς όμοιους ύπολογισμούς ημών δέ καί ταΰτ' άπολιπόντω ν διό τούς  
παραπλήσιους λόγους." και μετά μικρόν ού μόνον δέ μετά τώ ν προκεκοφότων έπί ποσόν και έν άγω γαΐς  
καί έν έθεσι ποιοΐς γεγονότω ν, oîov παρά Λεύκωνι καί Ίδανθύρσω." Stobaeus I I 7 1113-5  Wachsmuth also 
records that "the sage will be king sometimes and will live with a king who manifests both a good nature and a love 
of learning" (καί βασιλεύσειν θέ ποτέ τόν νουν (έχοντα) καί βασιλεΐ συμβιώσεσθαι καί ευφυΐαν έμφαίνοντι 
καί φιλομάθειαν).
45 Leucon (389/8-349/8) was a member o f the Spartodd dynasty which ruled at Panticapaeum, in the Crimea, on the 
west side o f the Cimmerian Bosporus, which connected the Black Sea with the Sea of Azor (OCD s.v. 'Spartodds'). 
Idanthyrsus was a Scythian ruler, and 'Scythian' was applied to various Asian tribes, espedally to those who lived in 
the region between the Carpathians and the river Don (OCD s.v. 'Scythia'). Plutarch also makes reference to this 
passage from On Lives more obliquely at Comm not 1061d, and Strabo SVF 3.692 also records the fact that 
Chrysippus discussed Leucon.
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[N] By our magnanimity we have not shut ourselves within the walls of one city, 
but instead have gone forth for interaction with the whole earth and have proclaimed 
that the world is our patria just in order that we might give a wider field to our 
virtue. Is the tribunal closed to you, and are you barred from the rostrum and the 
assembly? Look how many broad regions lie open behind you, how many peoples; 
never can you be blocked from a part so large that a still larger part will not be left 
to you.46
So it is that Chrysippus and Seneca can consistently say that beneficence is owed to human beings 
as such and that we are all fellow-citizens in the cosmopolis while also allowing that a good human 
being can engage in politics in such a way that some people are benefited more than others. We 
cannot help all people equally, and we can consider which set of people to benefit as the optimal 
way o f helping people generally.
Conclusions
At this point, Plutarch's criticisms are disarmed. The commitment to cosmopolitanism 
does not make engaging in local politics inconsistent, and the commitment to politics does not 
make an avoidance of political engagement inconsistent. Now I want to extract two lessons from 
this account, one for contemporary observers of Stoicism and the other for contemporary theorists 
of cosmopolitanism.
First, those who consider Stoicism apolitical should perhaps reconsider the Stoic 
endorsement of the political life. It is true that the Stoics do not show an immense amount of 
attention to the shape a regime ought to take, nor to the distribution of resources, the maintenance 
of physical security, or the provision of criminal justice. But that is because they think that these
46 Seneca, Trama 4.4: Ideo magno animo nos non unías urbis moenibus clusimus sed in totíus urbis commercium 
emisimus patriamque nobis mundum professi sumus, ut liceret latiorem virtud campum dare. Praeclusum tibi 
tribunal est et rostris prohibais aut comitiis: respice post te quantum latissimarum regionum pateat, quantum 
populorum; numquam i ta tibi magna pars obstruetur ut non maior reliquatur.
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specialized questions are relatively unimportant and that good answers to these specialized 
questions will depend closely on the details of the particular circumstances. The function of 
politics still very much matters to the Stoics. If we do not give up on this fact, we might turn the 
tables on those who call the Stoics apolitical. The Stoics seem apolitical by our lights. But of 
course, by their lights, it is we who are apolitical. For we show almost no attention whatsoever to 
the actual point of politics, as the Stoics see i t  we do not aim to make people better.47
Moreover, if we keep in mind the Stoics' commitment to politics on their own terms, we 
can more fully appreciate the fundamental importance of advice and moral education to their ethics. 
The choice between the preferred lives of politics and philosophy is made at least in part in terms of 
how we can help others become better. The process of helping others become better, the process 
of advising in multiple ways, is central. Many have seen that modem moral philosophers are all 
too quick to think of morality as a solitary enterprise, failing to see that getting things right is an 
on-going process shared with others who offer advice and models. But it is rarely noted that the 
Stoics do not make this mistake. For them, making progress toward getting things right in practice 
is most definitely a shared enterprise; it is, quite simply, a political enterprise.
Second, those who consider cosmopolitanism inconsistent with local service should reflect 
more closely on the Stoic model of politics, as well. If we can agree that we should help other 
people live better lives, then we face the question, Which others? Now, we could say that we 
should help everyone somehow, but draw distinctions among our beneficiaries in order to 
differentiate the ways in which we shoud help them. This response is very familiar from the 
traditional idea of rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's and rendering unto God what is God's 
(Matthew 22:21). But this initial distinction just forestalls our question.48 For any given kind of 
benefit that we bestow, we can repeat our question: to whom should we give that kind of benefit?
47 On this score, the Stoics are right in  line with Plato and Aristotle, contra Reesor's claim to the contrary (The 
Political Theory o f the Old and Middle Stoa. 59).
48 Moreover, it is not an easy distinction to make, as Anscombe realizes ("On the Source o f the Authority o f  the 
State," 132): "If is indeed one of the troubles about government, that it is difficult to specify the 'things that are 
Caesar's'. "_
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Now the cosmopolitan challenge becomes clear. Our Stoics insist that the most important sort of 
benefit—the serious work of helping others to live better lives—should not be arbitrarily limited to 
just one set of human beings, but should be thoughtfully bestowed in an optimal fashion.
We are free, of course, to insist on a different conception of the good than the Stoics', so 
as to conceive of helping others to live better lives in a more material way. We are also free to 
decide that helping others to live better lives is only in a limited fashion proper to politics, which 
should stay out of the way. But still the Stoic challenge remains. If we are going to concentrate 
our efforts to help compatriots with our political action, our charitable contributions, and our 
ongoing concern, and if we are not going to consider how we might have helped human beings 
better by locating or distributing our efforts differently, then we need principled reasons for 
thinking that compatriots deserve our benefits more. We cannot assume that cosmopolitanism is 
not an option for locally engaged people.49
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